Interim Indonesia Update

Summary

Golkar expects to compensate for big losses in Java/Bali with big wins of 50% to 70% in the provinces outside Java. Sumatra, with 100 of the 219 seats outside Java/Bali in the DPR (Parliament) and 40 of the 165 regional delegates in the MPR is critical to this strategy. After two weeks in Sumatra, I do not see Golkar achieving the percentages it needs to win overall. The non-status quo parties are likely to do well in Sumatra, but not as well as in Java. With a strong showing in Java/Bali, which has 243 seats, they should narrowly control the DPR and the MPR.

From 3 to 14 May I travelled by land across Sumatra assessing the relative strengths of the parties competing in the 7 June elections. I began in Lampung province and covered South Sumatra, Jambi, West Sumatra, North Sumatra and Aceh. I did not cover Bengkulu province (4 seats) and Riau (10 seats).

The Situation on the Ground

Party political activity has extended widely across the island, although the level of political understanding and commitment is lower in rural areas. Nevertheless, with the exception of Aceh, all the areas covered are calm and, so far, there has been no serious conflict between the parties. For example, the many Golkar flags across the island and the numerous PDI Budi Hardjono flags around Medan have not been pulled down, as they would have been in much of Java.

Sumatra does not have the infrastructure of Java. As a result, election preparations have been patchy. In some places, voter registration had barely begun, for example in the Indian Ocean islands. In Aceh, the independence movement has effectively forced a boycott of the elections by discouraging voter registration in large parts of the province.

Large sections of the population, however, are relatively unsophisticated. Election research at the University of North Sumatra, for example, suggests that there is little knowledge in many rural areas that 48 political parties are competing in this election. Villagers in these areas can identify only the three New Order parties. There is scope for confusion of Megawati Soekarnoputri’s PDI with the PDI of Budi Hardjono.

There is also a widespread fear that the more isolated villagers will still be susceptible to pressure to vote for Golkar from officials and the military. Although such abuses are certain occur and there will be many administrative blunders, there was nothing to suggest that the poll will not be, on the whole, free and fair.

An important underlying issue is antipathy towards Java/Jakarta. Jakarta is seen as expropriating Sumatran wealth in oil, gas and agricultural exports for the benefit not just of the New Order, but for Java and the capital more generally. This underlying antipathy is reinforced by specific local concerns, for example disputes surrounding land resumed for plantations and factories. In West Sumatra, an additional issue is the perceived humiliation of the province following its participation in the abortive PRRI rebellion in the 1950s. In Aceh, the problem has reached the stage where open warfare is possible.

Predicting the Outcome

It is impossible to predict with any confidence the relative strength of the parties in Sumatra. Provinces vary dramatically one with another in terms of ethnic composition, religious affiliation and wealth. North Sumatra is perhaps Indonesia’s most diverse province ethnically and religiously, with its Malay, Chinese and Acehnese minorities and with Christian and Muslim Bataks living side by side in the same village.

Party affiliations are also more diverse across most of Sumatra compared to Java. The smaller parties could win seats in several provinces. They include the National Workers’ Party (PBN), the Moon and Star Party (PBB), the Justice and Unity Party (PKP), the New Masyumi Party (PMB) and the Peace Loving Party (Partai Cinta Damai). Partai Cinta Damai is a Sufi-based party led by a North Sumatran and has a pre-existing organisational structure in North Sumatra and elsewhere in Sumatra.

Golkar 50-70%?

While it is impossible to be precise about the likely election results, it is possible to say that Golkar cannot achieve the very high percentages it needs to compensate for its likely poor showing in Java/Bali. The more likely result for Golkar is a consistent 20-30% across all the provinces except Aceh. This is higher than the result it is likely to achieve in Java/Bali but it is not enough to give it control of the DPR and the MPR.

PDI Perjuangan

Megawati Soekarnopoetri appears to have an underlying 15-20% of the vote in all the provinces I visited except Aceh. Her share of the vote is likely to be higher -- 25-30% -- in Lampung and North and South Sumatra. This share of the vote in Sumatra, if achieved, should make her party the largest group in Parliament.

PAN

PAN could do extremely well in West Sumatra, where it could get up to half the vote. In other provinces, it could achieve 10-15% of the vote.

PPP and PKB

PPP has a strong party structure across the island because it is one of the three New Order political parties. It is difficult, however, to assess the extent to which this structure translates into votes. PPP also faces strong competition from PAN and the smaller Muslim parties -- specifically the Justice Party (PK), the New Masyumi Party and the Moon and Star party (PBB). PPP could secure 10% in most provinces (but see Aceh below).

Gus Dur’s PKB party does not seem to have a strong presence in any province, with the exception of Lampung.

Aceh

Aceh is in most respects an exception to the situation elsewhere in Sumatra. Travelling through the three East Coast kabupaten of Pidie and North and East Aceh, one would conclude that there is no election about to take place in Indonesia. For hundreds of kilometers there are no elections flags, banners or pamphlets. Everywhere, however, are thousands of pro-referendum signs painted on the road -- so that the hated ABRI cannot remove them -- in letters as wide as one lane or even the road itself.

The pro-independence movement (GAM), which has the enthusiastic support of much of the population, has mounted an effective boycott of voter registration. On polling day itself, voter turnout is likely to be lower even than the figures for voter registration. This includes in the capital of the province, Banda Aceh. There is likely to be a better turnout in transmigration areas and plantation along the border with North Sumatra.

A low and unevenly distributed voter turnout could produce a bizarre result. Golkar could do very well when the mood of the province suggests that it should do very badly because of its identification with ABRI and President Habibie. Megawati could secure more seats than PDI might otherwise have expected. PPP and PAN are likely to do more poorly than they would have expected in a strongly Muslim province.

The Total Picture

A recent survey of 3,000 respondents by the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES) suggests Golkar will get about 20% of the vote in Java. This is slightly more favourable to Golkar than the percentages used to generate the table in my last report.

Although there are some statistical problems with the LP3ES survey, I have reworked the data underlying the earlier table using the LP3ES figures for Java. I have also adjusted the earlier data for Sumatra to reflect my observations in Sumatra. The following reworking of the table takes into account, for example, the possibility of an erratic result in Aceh with Golkar winning seats there:

* Does not include 38 ABRI MPs or 28 unallocated MPR regional delegates.

This is a somewhat less clear outcome for the opposition parties than emerged in the earlier version of the table. Neither PDI, PAN nor PKB can afford to be complacent.

The smaller margin for the opposition parties underlines the importance of welding a solid alliance between the three major opposition parties even before the poll, so that they can quickly claim victory if the results are in their favour. It also points to the need to co-opt support from likeminded smaller parties, and keep a close eye on the regional assemblies (DPRD I) as they each decide their five regional delegates. These elections provide an easy way to buy MPR members, well out of the political spotlight in Jakarta.

The narrow margin also underlines the importance of weaning PPP away from Golkar.

This week, the opposition parties made moves in both directions. On 17 May, PKB, PAN and PDI signed a common commitment to oppose the status quo. On 21 May, PAN entered into an agreement with PPP and the small Muslim Justice Party (PK) committing all three parties to denying Habibie the presidency. A PKB leader was present, but PKB did not sign. If all five parties can maintain this common commitment to opposing Habibie and Golkar, then Habibie is in real trouble.

24 May 1999